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56 In addition to marshalling his own evidence, MacLean cites Laurie Adkin’s work on the dynamics of “carbon 
democracy” in a Canadian context: see, eg, Laurie Adkin, ed, First World Petro-Politics: The Political Ecology and 

























































B. Fair treatment of the relevant case law
Professor	Newman	bolsters	his	attack	on	Professors	Chalifour	and	MacLean	with	a	
selective	and	self-serving	portrayal	of	the	case	law	at	the	centre	of	the	dispute.	He	does	this	
in	two	ways:	by	exaggerating	the	degree	of	division	amongst	the	judges	in	the	
Saskatchewan	and	Ontario	reference	cases,	and	by	presenting	a	blinkered	view	of	the	case	
law	on	the	POGG	power.	
First,	he	writes	that	the	seven	judges	in	the	Ontario	and	Saskatchewan	reference	
cases	who	would	uphold	the	federal	legislation	“are	split	among	three	different—and	not	
entirely	consistent—explanations	of	the	legal	basis	for	federal	jurisdiction,	meaning	there	
is	as	strong	a	combined	vote	for	the	unconstitutionality	of	the	legislation	as	for	any	single	
explanation	of	its	constitutionality.”69	
There	are	two	problems	with	this	claim:	it	exaggerates	the	disagreement	amongst	
the	judges	and	it	compares	apples	and	oranges.	Professor	Newman	is	correct	that	the	
three-judge	majority	of	the	Ontario	Court	of	Appeal	characterized	the	pith	and	substance	of	
the	legislation	as	“establishing	minimum	national	standards	to	reduce	GHG	emissions,”	
whereas	the	three-judge	majority	of	the	Saskatchewan	Court	of	Appeal	characterized	it	as	
“establishing	minimum	national	standards	of	price	stringency	for	GHG	emissions”	and	the	
concurring	judge	in	Ontario	characterized	it	as	“establishing	minimum	national	greenhouse	
gas	emissions	pricing	standards	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions.”70	Professor	Newman	
asserts	that	“there	are	differing	levels	of	breadth”	and	“even	explicit	clashes”	between	these	
three	characterizations	and	promises	to	“return	later	in	the	article	to	consider	these	
distinctions	further.”71		
The	article	does	later	discuss	several	of	the	characterizations	proffered	by	parties	
and	interveners,	but	nowhere	does	it	directly	compare	the	characterizations	offered	by	
these	seven	judges.	The	“pith	and	substance”	characterizations	of	the	Saskatchewan	three-
judge	majority	and	one	Ontario	concurring	judge,	in	particular,	amount	to	the	same	thing:	
setting	minimum	national	GHG	price	standards.	Any	distinction	between	“establishing	
minimum	national	standards	of	price	stringency	for	GHG	emissions”	and	“establishing	
minimum	national	greenhouse	gas	emissions	pricing	standards	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	
emissions”	is	fine	if	there	is	one	at	all.	And	while	the	difference	between	setting	minimum	
national	GHG	pricing	standards	and	the	Ontario	majority’s	“minimum	national	standards	
for	GHG	emissions	reductions”	is	real,	these	seven	judges	were	not	far	apart	on	this	point	
67	Ibid	at	189	n	12.	
68	Ibid	at	190.	
69	Ibid	at	188.	
70	Ibid	at	188	n	6.	
71	Ibid.	
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compared	to	the	wide	range	of	characterizations	proffered	by	parties	and	interveners,	and	
they	all	agreed	that	the	legislation	was	a	valid	exercise	of	the	national	concern	branch	of	
the	POGG	power.	If	anything,	Professor	Newman	acknowledges	the	similarity	amongst	
these	opinions	when	he	writes	“the	majority	judges	have	ended	up	accepting	
characterizations	focused	on	the	setting	of	a	national	minimum	price”	on	carbon	
emissions.72		
Our	point	is	not	to	pick	apart	the	fine	points	of	these	cases	or	of	Professor	Newman’s	
argument.	Rather,	it	is	that	by	asserting	that	these	opinions	present	three	different	and	
partly	inconsistent	explanations	of	the	constitutionality	of	federal	carbon	pricing	legislation	
without	actually	comparing	and	contrasting	those	explanations,	the	article	is	not	fair	to	the	
judicial	decisions	under	consideration.		
The	second	problem	with	the	claim	that	there	is	“as	strong	a	combined	vote	for	
unconstitutionality	as	for	any	single	explanation	of	its	constitutionality”	is	that	it	conflates	
apples	with	oranges.	Votes	for	unconstitutionality	are	votes	for	a	particular	conclusion.	
Votes	for	explanations	of	constitutionality	are	votes	for	a	particular	path	to	a	conclusion.	A	
conclusion	and	a	path	to	a	conclusion	are	different	things.	The	multiplicity	of	judges	on	
appellate	courts	means	that	the	number	of	paths	is	likely	to	exceed	the	number	of	
conclusions.	The	reverse	is	impossible	if	the	conclusion	in	question	is	a	binary	choice,	as	it	
is	here	(constitutional	or	unconstitutional).	In	such	a	case	the	number	of	conclusions	can	
equal	but	not	exceed	the	number	of	explanations.	Therefore,	to	compare	the	number	of	
votes	for	or	against	a	law’s	constitutionality	with	the	number	of	votes	for	any	particular	
explanation	of	its	constitutionality	or	unconstitutionality	is	not	very	informative	and	risks	
giving	a	false	impression	of	the	strength	of	opposition	to	the	federal	carbon	pricing	
legislation	in	these	two	decisions.		
Another	way	in	which	the	article	is	not	scrupulously	fair	to	the	legal	materials	is	by	
presenting	a	partial	and	blinkered	account	of	the	POGG	case	law.	Professor	Newman	claims	
that	“the	case	law	does	not	support	the	three-branch	description	of	[the	POGG	power]	often	
cheerily	offered	by	those	who	would	centralize	the	federation.”73	He	is	right	that	the	courts	
have	construed	this	branch	narrowly	and	have	rarely	invoked	it	to	uphold	federal	
legislation.	He	may	even	be	right	to	suggest	that	the	Supreme	Court’s	consideration	of	the	
federal	carbon	price	references	will	be	“an	occasion	to	sort	out	what	branches	actually	exist	
on	the	POGG	power,”	and	that	“there	are	real	arguments	for	considering	[the	national	
concern	branch’s]	legal	status	suspect.”74	But	he	supports	the	latter	claim	by	painting	a	
selective	picture	of	the	national	concern	jurisprudence.		
First,	Professor	Newman	suggests	that	the	national	concern	branch	has	only	been	
used	to	uphold	federal	legislation	once,	in	Crown	Zellerbach,75	and	that	the	judges	in	that	
case	created	it	“out	of	whole	cloth”	merely	because	they	“thought	they	needed	it.”76	This	
claim	is	not	substantiated.	First,	Newman	gives	no	reason	for	rejecting	the	two	other	
Supreme	Court	decisions	that	are	commonly	cited	as	upholding	federal	legislation	under	
72	Ibid	at	198-99.	
73	Newman,	supra	note	4	at	201.	
74	Ibid	at	196	n	47.	
75	R	v	Crown	Zellerbach	Canada	Ltd,	[1988]	1	SCR	401.	
76	Newman,	supra	note	4	at	196	n	47	and	accompanying	text.	
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the	national	concern	branch,77	other	than	to	allege	that	some	unidentified	scholars	
consider	them	to	fall	under	the	“gap”	branch.78		
Second,	his	criterion	for	judging	the	doctrine’s	existence	is	unduly	demanding:	the	
number	of	cases	in	which	federal	legislation	has	been	upheld	by	the	Supreme	Court	solely	
and	explicitly	on	this	basis.	He	does	not	acknowledge	that	the	branch’s	existence	might	also	
be	determined	by	the	number	of	cases	in	which	the	Supreme	Court	and	other	courts	have	
classified	matters	as	falling	within	the	national	concern	branch	even	if	they	did	not	uphold	
federal	legislation	on	this	basis;79	and	cases	in	which	courts	have	said	the	branch	exists.80	
These	cases	date	back	at	least	to	1946,81	and	possibly	much	earlier.	To	claim	that	the	
Supreme	Court	invented	the	branch	“out	of	whole	cloth”	in	Crown	Zellerbach,	and	that	“the	
case	law	does	not	support	the	three-branch	description	of	the	POGG	power,”82	unfairly	
downplays	this	judicial	history.		
The	existence	of	the	three	branches	of	the	POGG	power	is	accepted	by	Canadian	
courts	and	commentators.	Professor	Newman’s	own	co-authored	constitutional	law	
treatise	makes	no	suggestion	that	the	national	concern	branch	does	not	exist,	nor	that	it	
was	invented	in	1988.83	As	the	late	doyen	of	Canadian	constitutional	law,	Peter	Hogg,	
wrote,	“The	national	concern	branch	of	p.o.g.g.	has	been	recognized	in	many	cases	since	
1946”	and	“The	cumulative	effect	of	these	cases	is	to	establish	firmly	the	national	concern	
branch	of	p.o.g.g.”84		
We	have	no	problem	with	Professor	Newman	claiming	that	the	national	concern	
branch	does	not	exist;	what	we	object	to	is	his	doing	so	without	giving	fair	consideration	to	
the	decades	of	case	law	and	scholarly	commentary	that	point	in	the	opposite	direction.	
4. So what?
Professor	Newman’s	article	is	not	an	egregious	case,	but	in	our	view	it	crosses	a	line	that	
separates	distortion	and	disparagement	from	constructive	scholarly	debate.	The	problems	
we	have	documented	are	serious	enough	to	cast	doubt	on	the	article	as	a	whole,	not	just	the	
portions	we	identify	as	problematic.	These	problems	deserve	to	be	aired	so	that	parties	and	
courts	do	not	misplace	their	reliance	on	the	article	in	making	decisions	about	the	carbon	
pricing	reference	cases.	
77	Chalifour,	“Making	Federalism	Work,”	supra	note	43	at	179,	citing	.Johannesson	v	West	St	Paul	(Rural	
Municipality),	[1952]	1	SCR	292	(aeronautics);	Munro	v	National	Capital	Commission,	[1966]	SCR	663	
(National	Capital	Region).	
78	Newman,	supra	note	4	at	196	n	47.	
79	Eg	Ontario	Hydro	v	Ontario	(Labour	Relations	Board),	[1993]	3	SCR	327;	Pronto	Uranium	Mines	Ltd	v	Ontario	
(Labour	Relations	Board),	[1956]	OR	862,	5	DLR	(2d)	342	(atomic	energy).		
80	Examples	from	the	Supreme	Court	include	Reference	Re	Anti-Inflation	Act,	1975,	[1976]	2	SCR	373;	Labatt	
Breweries	v	Canada	(AG),	[1980]	1	SCR	914;	Schneider	v	British	Columbia,	[1982]	2	SCR	112;	RJR-MacDonald	
Inc	v	Canada	(AG),	[1994]	1	SCR	311;	RJR-MacDonald	Inc	v	Canada,	[1995]	3	SCR	199;	R	v	Hydro-Quebec,	
[1997]	3	SCR	213;	R	v	Malmo-Levine,	[2003]	3	SCR	571.	
81	Ontario	(AG)	v	Canada	Temperance	Federation,	[1946]	AC	193,	[1946]	2	DLR	1	(PC).	
82	Newman,	supra	note	4	at	196	n	47	and	201.	
83	Régimbald	and	Newman,	supra	note	46	at	232-38	(§§6.15-6.30).	
84	Peter	W	Hogg,	Constitutional	Law	of	Canada,	2017	student	ed	(Toronto:	Thomson	Reuters,	2017)	at	17.11	
and	17.12	(§17.3(a)).	
WORKING	PAPER	2/2020	
Wood,	Doelle	&	Scott,	Responsible	Scholarship	in	a	Crisis	 page	13	
A	rigorous	peer	review	process	would	normally	catch	most	problems	like	the	ones	
we	have	identified	with	this	article.85	Journal	editors	may	feel	pressure	to	dispense	with	or	
rush	review	processes	to	maximize	the	relevance	and	exposure	of	articles	addressing	time-
sensitive	issues	like	the	carbon	pricing	references	or	the	COVID-19	pandemic.	The	
retracted	hyrdoxychloroquine	article	we	mentioned	earlier	was	published	around	a	month	
after	submission,	impeding	thorough	peer	review.	Journals	should	certainly	strive	to	make	
timely	contributions	to	discourse	on	pressing	public	issues,	but	not	at	the	expense	of	norms	
of	responsible	scholarship.	
Vigorous	debate	and	disagreement	are	the	lifeblood	of	academic	discourse	and	the	
engine	for	advancement	of	knowledge.	To	insist	on	rigour	and	fairness	in	such	debate	is	not	
to	impose	“political	correctness”	on	scholars	who	espouse	unpopular	views.	Nor	is	it	a	
manifestation	of	the	fragility	of	a	liberal	academic	establishment	unable	to	handle	
controversial	perspectives.	It	is	necessary	to	enable	constructive	scholarly	debate	and	to	
maintain	public	trust	in	academic	expertise.		
We	have	no	doubt	that	constructive	scholarly	debate	on	climate	change,	carbon	
pricing,	division	of	powers,	the	national	concern	branch,	subsidiarity,	regulatory	capture	
and	the	role	of	academics	in	a	democracy	is	possible.	To	be	clear,	our	purpose	in	this	article	
is	not	to	take	a	position	in	that	debate.	This	article	is	intended	neither	as	a	critique	of	the	
substance	of	Professor	Newman’s	position	on	those	issues,	nor	as	a	defence	of	those	of	
Professors	Chalifour	and	MacLean.	If	we	defend	their	work	here,	it	is	only	to	the	extent	
necessary	to	substantiate	our	claim	that	Professor	Newman’s	article	does	not	uphold	
standards	of	scrupulous	fairness	in	scholarly	research.	We	offer	this	article	as	a	reminder	of	
mutual	expectations	for	responsible	scholarship	and	look	forward	to	the	continuation	of	
vigorous,	constructive	and	publicly	beneficial	scholarly	debate	on	these	important	issues.	
85	The	Saskatchewan	Law	Review	failed	to	reply	to	inquiries	in	December,	2019,	June,	2020	and	July,	2020,	
whether	Professor	Newman’s	article	was	peer	reviewed.	
